METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR A THEORY OF VALUE

IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF A. N. WHITEHEAD  

PART II

The Problems of Value

 

CHAPTER SIX

Creative Activity as the Source of Value

 

[Note: Footnotes are designated in red and may be accessed by scrolling down the page to the green sections.

 

Note also that since since they refer to the paper version of this work, references to actual pages of the thesis are not accurate in this online medium.]

 

Below are the full titles of books referred to in the footnotes.

 

PR, Process and Reality

SMW, Science in the Modern World

MT, Modes of Thought

AI, Adventures of Ideas

AE, The Aims of Education

SmB, Symbolism, its Meaning and Effect

RM, Religion in the Making

ESP, Essays in Science and Philosophy

FofR The Function of Rerason

OT Organization of Thought

 

Section A:

Relative and Absolute Value &endash; a Necessary Distinction

This chapter is concerned with the nature of value in Whitehead's philosophy and its relation to Whitehead's metaphysloal notion of concrete existence interpreted as creative activity. I am seeking to explain the nature of what Professor Perry calls "general value" - the character that is common to all special value fields, such as ethics and esthetics, but still it is necessary in discussing Whitehead's views on value (and perhaps in presenting any adequate discussion of value) to start with a distinction - the distinction between what I call "relative value" and what I call "absolute value".

 

These terms &endash; "relative value" and "obsolute value" - are not Whitehead's. He has no term for what is here called relative value. John Laird, who recognizes this notion of Whitehead's as a definite theory about the nature of value, calls it "natural election" 1. This seems like a good name for Whitehead's notion, but I am not using it, first, because I am not in this chapter interested in distinguishing it from other somewhat similar notions of value, such as "interest theories", as is Laird; and, secondly, because I am primarily interested in distinguishing it from another kind of notion of value which I find in Whitehead, what I have called "absolute value" 2.

 

Whitehead has a term, but a rather odd one, for absolute value. He calls it "importance". One reason why this is a rather uncomfortable term to use as a technical term is that it is almost impossible not to continue to use it in its more general, non-teohnical meaning, in which, for instance, it frequently applies to relative, as well as to non-relative value 3. It seems to me that Whitehead himself occasionally forgets that he is using it in a somewhat restricted sense and reverts to its more general meaning. I am using "absolute value" instead, though I cite Whitehead's term "importance" as an equivalent for it throughout primarily because I want to point up the distinctive quality of this kind of value. "Non-relative" might be a better term, since there to no "Absolute" in Whitehead's philosophy and no value independent of any point of view, but non-relative suffers from the weakness of all negative terms - that of denoting too large a class of entities. What I mean by "absolute value" is merely those aspects of value which are the same from all points of view, or on which there must be general agreement among all value-sensitive entities because of the metaphysical requirements common to all value situations.

 

Though "relative" and "absolute" are the best words I can find to use as labels for the two sides of this value distinction in Whitehead's philoisophy they do not suggest the full nature of each of these two general kinds of value. No set of terms applied to value seems to be adequate to express the distinction fully, but there are a number of sets commonly used in discussions of value which either approximate this distinction or emphasize one aspect of it. I shall discuss briefly the following sets in order to cast more light on this distinction: "means" and "ends", "extrinsic" and "intrinsic" values, "subjective" and "objective" values, and "the good" and "the right".

 

Means and ends: What I have termed "relative value", the value involved in each prehension, is certainly a kind of "means-value" or "instrumental value". Whitehead, however, considers "means" in its widest possible sense, because not only deliberately chosen instruments and proximate conditions for bringing about an end, but also what are usually thought of as merely necessary conditions, underlying conditions, and the most remote circumstances imaginable are also thought of as being given value by the prehensive process, and even frustrating circumstances difficult to list as "means" are among the entities taking on value in the prehensive process. Every actual thing, and, in a sense, every possibility (including those rejected), has some value to each occasion.

 

"End-value" is not as easy to locate. Whitehead certainly believes in attainments, satisfactions and enjoyments, but what is there in these which is distinctively end-value? It seems true, psychologically at least, that means become ends, and ends become means. What is at first pursued only because it contributes to or makes possible some satisfaction becomes an end in itself &endash; the sea captain who originally went to sea only to make a living but in comfortable retirement lives by the sea, and surrounds himself with a nautical atmosphere is a familiar example. On the other hand, an attained satisfaction often drops back to the status of means to further goals - the small boy enjoys the triumph of learning to ride a bicycle and then uses the skill as a means of getting to school more easily. Whitehead is well aware of these transformations. Indeed, he gives them a metaphysical setting in which they become essential aspects of concrete process. Everything is a "means" to each occasion - an external condition to be taken account of. But the taking account of is also appropriation 4, and so everything becomes part of the internal nature of the occasion and is enjoyed as an aspect of its satisfaction by the occasion. But then aspects of this satisfaction constitute the "objective immortality" of the occasion, that is, become means which further occasions must take aecount of.

 

Taking into account this close interaction and shifting position of means and ends, some writers would seem to conclude that there is no real difference between the notion of means and the notion of ends, or, at least, that it is not a fundamental distinction for theory of value 5. Such a posiition,, however, seems to rest on the assumption that the distinction between means and ends is merely psychological. It isn't. It is a genuinely axiological distinction, and one that cannot be dispensed with. Whether merely pursued or directly enjoyed, some things have value because they contribute in some way to other things that have value. These are means. They may also be ends, but if they are also ends, it is because they are valuable on another basis - as ends. What is the axiological nature of being an end? It is certainly to be valuable in and for itself. It is not merely to be enjoyed, though it may turn out that enjoyment is one of the things that is valuable in and for itself. For that matter, Whitehead emphasizes that being a means, contributing to the value of other things, may also be valuable in and for itself, and so be an aspect of end-value. I recognize that this argument is in some ways similar to arguments used by G.E. Moore to support his contention that there is a value essence of goodness 6, but I think this further and non-Whiteheadian conclusion rests on additional and false premises 7. What is essential to end-value is that its value does not rest on relations to other values. There is. something essentially relative about means-value and something essentially absolute about end-value.

 

Extrunsic and intrinsic value: This distinction is similar to the means-end distinction; indeed, it seems to have originated as an attempt on the part of writers on theory of value to find a less equivocal technical terminology for the traditional means-end concept. Its one adtantage may be that it emphasizes the presence of value in and for itself in intrinsic value, for an extrinsiuc value is valuable because of some relationship &endash; it may be necessary to, useful to, desired by, or some similar relation - which it has to something that is an intrinsic value. An intrinsic value is good in itself. Still, this being "good in itself" is hard to grasp. As Laird points out, it camot mean, as some have thought, good in the absence of any consequences or good in spite of all consequences 8. Consequences can still be relevant to the value of an intrinsic value.

 

Subjective and objective value: These terms are often used to refer to values which are peculiar to one individual point of view and values on which all valuing subjects agree, or should agree. This is certainly an aspect of the distinction which I am trying to make between relative and absolute value in Whitehead's philosophy, but it would be very unfortunate to use these terms to describe it, because for Whitehead "subjective" means for itself. It does not mean cut off from others. So it is perhaps more closely related to abso1ute value. "Objective", on the contrary, means for another, and so involves a relativity that makes it more relevant to means-value, and.relative value in general.

 

The good and the right: This is a distinction proper to ethics, and I shall refer to it again when I discuss the special problem of ethics 9. Some moralists do not even recognize this distinction, and those that do sometimes describe it in different terms 10. The good may include both means and ends, but it is relative to the individual and related to him by some sort of natural inclination &endash; liking, interest or enjoyment. The right is the peculiar characteristic of "duty" or "obligation" relating universal moral principles to the moral agent. Now, Whitehead does not seem to endorse the notion of a special value quality of obligation. Indeed, he thinks that even the most universal ideals and metaphysically oriented values operate in the world through "persuasion" 11, but still he does think that there are values which do not depend upon inclination in any way peculiar to some kind of individuals for their value. These values are valuable because of the nature of things, and, if individuals incline towards them it is because it contributes to the fulfillment and reality of the individual to do so. Like Aristotle he believes that the absolute good is "what all things aim at" 12, but it is not good just because they aim at it.

 

All of these distinctions which have been made in discussions of values help in an approach to the distinction between what I have called "relative value" and "absolute value". But no one of them is quite equivalent to it, because Whitehead's distinction rests on a new basis. Each kind of value has its source in creative, activity, as I shall try to show in the subsequent sections of this chapter. But creative activity is also the bridge between the two kinds of value. They are not as distinctive from each other, and certainly not as opposed to each other, as the notions under each distinction discussed above are frequently supposed to be. I agree with Mr. Bixler, though not with his choice of terms, when he says,

 

Whitehead is here saying that we cannot make any final distinction between subjective and objective value or between psychological and metaphysical justification for value. In the case of value, as in the case of efficient and final causes, experience and thought, actual physical inheritance and apparent possibilities, we are confronted with a single process with two aspects which literally grow out of each other. Each is derivative from the other and necessary for it. If we protest that we obscure the difference between the two, such as the ethical difference between living for oneself and living for a cause, by merging them in this way, Whitehead replies that we cannot understand the difference or account for it unless we see the unity in the difference 13.

 

Absolute value is but an expansion and intensification of relative value, and yet a new principle has been introduced. Both relative and absolute value may be appraised and directly enjoyed, but the latter's appraisal and enjoyment involve the immanence of the universe in the value. This aspect con be more or less lacking, and there will still be value. Indeed, the two principles of value, though closely related and even interdependent, may conflict.

 

Acknowledging the tendency for these two kinds of value to coalesce in Whitehead's philosophy, particularly the tendency for absolute value to engulf relative value, I would still maintain that it is important to see that there are two distinct notions of value operating in his philosophy - not opposed, certainly not incompatible, yet different enough to make it desirable to understand each separately. I cite as evidence for this view that there are really two kinds of value in Whitehead's philosophy the frequent conclusions of commentators mentioned above, that he leans towards more than one theory of value 14. It is difficult to find passages in Whitehead's writings distinguishing and contrasting the two kinds of value because he tends to discuss them in widely separated contexts. The discussion of relative value centers around the earlier discussions of "prehension" in Science and the Modern World, and the discussion of absolute value centers around the consideration of the social sciences and humanities in Adventures of Ideas and Modes of Thought. As an example of a passage in which they seem to meet and yet be distinguished, however, I cite this one, from Religion in the Making, a book published between the two groups of books mentioned in the last sentence.

 

Value is inherent in actuality itself. To be an actual entity is to have a self-interest. This self-interest is a feeling of self-valuation; it is an emotional tone. The value of other things, not one's self, is the derivative value of being elements contributing to this ultimate self-interest. This self-interest is the interest of what one's existence, as in that epochal occasion, comes to. It is the ultimate enjoyment of being actual 15.

 

And yet this passage doesn't draw the distinction quite in the right place, for relative value isn't quite as derivative as here suggested nor as separable from self-interest. The contrast between the two types of value is more closely linked to two kinds of self-interest. This passage is frequently cited by those who believe that Whitehead has merely a psychological theory of value, but such an interpretation ignores the last sentence, in which it is apparent that the self-interest here referred to is not a restrictive self-interest, placing the self sharply over against the world, but rather a metaphysical self-interest in becoming something actual that fulfills and expresses the possibilities striving for-expression in one's "epoch".

 

Only a more..dotallod discussion of each of these kinds of value considered separately can make clear the details of their distinctive natures.

 

Footnotes for Chapter Six, Section A

 

1 The Idea of Value, Ch, 3.

 

2 Laird does not recognize that Whitehead has also a notion of non-relative value. This omission may be due to the fact that at the time The Idea of Value appeared, 1929, Whitehead's later books, particularly Adventures of Ideas and Modes of Thought, in which his ideas on non-relative value appear in their fullest expression, had not yet been published.

 

3 Dorothy Emmet in an article called "On the Idea of Importance", Philosophy, Vol. 21 (1946). pp. 234-44, starts a discussion of this term by citing some statements of Whitehead's about it, but she does not seem to see clearly, and certainly does accept the limitations he put upon its use as a technical term in his philosophy. What she seems to be analyzing is its ordinary English usage.

 

4 See above, Part. I, Ch. 2, Sect. C, pp. 57-61, on "Prehension".

 

5 John Dewey seems to take some such position in his monograph on "Theory of Valuation", International Encyclopedia of Unified Science., vol. 2, no. 4.

 

6 Principia Ethica, Ch. 6.

 

7 See above, Ch. 5, Sect. A (2), of this paper.

 

8 Op. cit., pp. 42-8.

 

9 See below, Ch. 7, Sect. C(1)(b), of this paper.

 

10 Such as the Kantian "interest" and "obligation". The "good" and the "right" are W.D. Ross' labels (op. cit.)

 

11 AI., pp, 213-16.

 

12 Nichomachean Ethics, Book I, Ch. 1.

 

13 "Whitehead's Philosophy of Religion", in Schillp, op. cit., pp. 500-501.

 

14 See, above, Ch. 5, Sect. A, pp. 226-28, and also Goheen's comment that seems to be superimposing the "esthetic notion of the part-wholo relation" on the "need-end relation" (op. cit., p. 455).

 

15 p. 100.

 

 

 

 

Move to Chapter Six, Section B