PART II
- PR, Process and Reality
- SMW, Science in the Modern World
- MT, Modes of Thought
- AI, Adventures of Ideas
- AE, The Aims of Education
- SmB, Symbolism, its Meaning and Effect
- RM, Religion in the Making
- FofR The Function of Reason
- OT Organization of Thought
I think that, although Whitehead does not have an organized and explicit theory of value, his views on value problems are worthy of serious consideration because (1) they point to a possible way out of the impasse into which the study of theory of value has drifted; (2) his notion of value has an expanded universality, extending the discussion of values to fields from which it was formerly often excluded; (3) his theory shows at least the promise of adequacy to deal with fundamental value problems; and (4) his theory seems to be superior to most in adaptability to changing concrete value situations, without resorting to complete relativism.
In the Introduction to this paper, I suggested that recent ventures in the theory of value had reached a sort of dead-end. Either they concluded that value terms expressed nothing but "emotive state* and so had no rational "meaning"; or they reduced value statements to statements about facts in one or more of the sciences - that is, statements about entities deliberately stripped of value -; or, finally, they drained value terms of all life and actuality made them refer to anomalous "essences". It was my contention that all these procedures reduced values to something valueless 1. I further suggested that this common fate of contemporary theories of value is due to their making a common assumption, explicitly or implicitly. This is the assumption that the bare existence of a thing can be completely dissociated from the value of that thing.
As a metaphysical doctrine, this Is the position that ontology is independent of axiology. It was my contention that even when the separation was made without any explicit formulation or acknowledgment, or when it was made on a merely "empirical" level as the distinction between "fact" and "value" -, or on a merely "methodological" level - as a distinction between "questions of fact" and "questions of attitude" -; still there are always, underlying such a distinction, metaphysical assumptions, acknowledged or not. It is part of Whitehead's significance for the discussion of value problems that he recalls us to an awareness of the inescapability of metaphysical presuppositions in value discussion, that he makes us aware of and critical of the metaphysical assumptions that we do make, and that he calls into question the validity and even the consistency of certain widely accepted metaphysical assumptions.
8pecifically, he questions the validity of the metaphysical assumption of the complete separation of value and existence. If this assumption is really no longer tenable, then the consideratlon of all value problems is In need of a thorough-going revision. Whitehead makes the first steps, at least, towards this reconstruction. For a notion of existence which is essentially linked to value considerations calls for metaphysical as well as axiological revisions. Whitehead's contributions are basically toward an analysis of this more complex notion of existence. It has been my contention that he presents this value-charged ontological, entity as a multiple creative act. To exist, to have concrete and complete reality, is to be an individual creative process.
In Part I of this paper, I have tried to follow Whitehead through his analysis of creative activity. In Part II I have tried to show how this notion of general ontological creative activity is the source of the values of all things, and how It accounts for the basic distinctions made among values and bow it approaches the solution of the major problems of theory of value. In this discussion, while drawing on Whitehead's explicit statements whenever possible, I have found it necessary to a considerable extent to go beyond his somewhat fragmentary treatment of these problems in order to show that his general philosophical outlook could be profitably extended to this field.
I hope that I have shown at least that when the problems of theory of value are reconsidered in the light of the metaphysical presupposition that value is very closely associated with existence, and existence Is interpreted as creative activity, then theory of value may help to explain value in other terms than merely valueless abstractions and still find that there are meaningful. and even useful answers to be discovered to the problems of value.
The notion of general value, as the feeling of a factor as operative in creative process, and of objective value, as promoting or realizing creative success, is broad enough to include the recognition of all the varieties of values which are usually recognized - esthetic, moral, "truth", religious values, and so on; and, besides, it permits Whitehead to extend the range of value realizations beyond the realm of conscious, human experience, to which many earlier theories have confined it, to subhuman life and even inorganic nature as participating in the generation and enjoyment of values. Thus it can be said that Whitehead has a more universal notion of value than those notions current among most other contemporary theories of value.
Whitehead's views on value have a fair claim not only to universality but to adequacy, because they provide a basis for dealing with the general problems of value. He not only provides grounds for the recognition of all varieties or value, but also a criterion for distinguishing between them and adjudicating their conflicting claims 2. And his view provides a genuine basis, in the notion of creative success, of making creative success of comparative value 3. He also explains evil as well, as good, and at least comes to grips with the internal problems of ethics 4.
Finally, Whitehead's approach to questions of value can claim a superior adaptability to the individual differences of value problems, and to changes and genuine novelties appearing in our awareness of values. He is not committed to any rigid set of standards - to any unalterable essences or any alleged set of facts which are supposed to account for some variety of value experience. Each new value experience must be judged in itself. And yet, he does not advocate complete relativism concerning values. The criteria of absolute value - the registering of creative success through the achievement of heightened intensity of experience and more adequate contrasts - are such, however, that they cannot completely prejudge all possible concrete situations. Radically new experience can only be judged after it has occurred 5.
Section B:
The "Weaknesses" of Whitehead's Notion of Value
There seem to be at least three kinds of inadequacy that can be alleged against Whitehead's notion of value: (1) that it is based on vague, subjective, irrational standards, (2) that it is one-sided, giving a disproportionate amount of weight to esthetic experience, and (3) that It does not provide a firm basis for our enlightened ethical principles.
It might be alleged that in basing value In general and the most important distinctions among values on the notion of creative activity, Whitehead is renouncing all clarity and precision in this field and retreating from the already vague and subjective standards which we formulate in value judgments themselves to a notion that is even more vague and subjective, if not downright mystical.
Whitehead would counter, I imagine, that the exactness which some theories pretend to in this field is a fake, that the problems of value in actual life come down to very concrete judgments to be made - in esthetics and morals, for example - and that his notion of creative activity and creative success is not an abstract universal standard in the usual sense, but rather, something which must finally be experienced concretely 6.
As for the charge of subjectivism in his standard of value, Whitehead could point out that creative activity, though it is always subjective in origin, has a social and objective aspect too. Indeed, it to one of the merits of his philosophy that there is nothing in it that is conceived as subjective in the sense at being out off from participation in the common actual world.
As for the charge of mysticism, Whitehead would admit that the notion of creative activity is not exhausted by nor completely reducible to the abstractions into which it is analyzed, but, nevertheless, (a) these abstractions, such as the notions of causal and teleological processes, do get at genuine aspects of creative activity, and (b) though he himself may only have started the analysis of this notion, no fixed limits can be imposed on the power of human intellect to understand any aspect of actuality 7. He rejects Bergson's contention that creative activity is intrinsically opposed to Intellectual analysis.
The charge of "aestheticism" is quite commonly brought against Whitehead. The "bill of particulars" states that Whitehead in developing his views on value and his metaphysics itself has given undue weight to esthetic experience. This means that he has not given sufficient weight to other aspects of value experience, particularly ethics, in shaping its view on values, and that he has not given enough weight to scientific knowledge in shaping his metaphysics. The alleged bad consequences of this esthetics are theoretical distortion and inadequacy and practical condoning of ruthlessness and indifference to suffering in ethics, if they favor the esthetic synthesis, and, in religion, the attribution of callous indifference to human suffering to God which makes Whitehead's notion of the deity "unavailable" for religious purposes 8.
In answer to this charge it must be pointed out, first, that Whitehead makes a distinction between esthetic experience as we usually have it in the production and enjoyment of objects of art, and the more complete esthetic experience, only approached in the arts, which has genuine metaphysical significance. The former, at least, is said to be one-sided, to need supplementation by ethical and other considerations, and not to have an absolute or superior claim over other kinds of experience 9.
Secondly, though I consider the charges of ruthlessness and indifference to individual suffering in his ethical speculation exaggerated - Whitehead really has a very civilized outlook on the world -, still, there do seem to be weaknesses in his ethical position. It is doubtful, however, whether these spring from an over-emphasis on esthetics 10. I have taken up Mr. Ely's indictments of Whitehead's God elsewhere in this paper 11. I think that it is possible for God to seek a kind of esthetic synthesis without being ruthless towards finite actualities or ignoring their troubles 12.
After submitting these qualifications, however, it must still be admitted that there is substance to the charge of estheticism, at least insofar as it asserts that there is a marked esthetic character to the fundamental notions in both Whitehead's notions on value and his metaphysics. Whitehead himself realizes this overall tone to his philosophy and always seems a little surprised by it because of his early background in mathematics and science 13. But he asserts the dominance of esthetic considerations without reserve, not only in theory of value, but in metaphysics, and even for God 14.
What justification can be given for this undue emphasis on esthetics? Perhaps none, finally. That is, an ideal philosophy wouldn't over-emphasize just one aspect of experience, but, as Whitehead repeatedly tells us, all finite creative activity must develop from a particular point of view. The most we can demand is a fresh and relatively successful point of view. There is no reason why emphasizing the esthetic aspect of things should not take us at least as far as over-emphasizing some other aspect of experience. This seems to be Whitehead's position at least.
Philosophic thought has to start from some limited section of our experience from epistemology, or from natural science, or from theology, or from mathematics. Also the investigation always retains the taint of its starting point. Every starting point has its merits, and its selection must depend upon the individual philosopher.
My own belief is that at present the most fruitful, because the most neglected, starting point is that section of value-theory which we term aesthetics. Our enjoyment of the values of human art, or of natural beauty, our horror of the obvious vulgarities and defacements which force themselves upon us - all these modes of experience are sufficiently abstracted to be relatively obvious. And yet evidently they disclose the very meaning of things 15.
At least Whitehead did not choose to synthesize the world from the esthetic point of view naively, or out of ignorance of other points of view 16. In fact, he conceives himself as following the lead of his great philosophical model Plato in finding the contemplation of beauty the high road to metaphysical insight 17.
The metaphysical significance of esthetic experience for Whitehead, however, seems to be rather different from what it was for Plato. What is it that Whitehead finds in the esthetic experience? It is the awareness - on a rather "artificial" plane, perhaps, and with some of the essential factors suppressed - of a genuine and significant creative act. We have always referred to the fine arts as "creative", and Whitehead sees in this more than just a metaphor 18.
I have already admitted that Whitehead's ethical views seem to me to be the weakest. aspect of his views on the problems of value. Whitehead has convinced me so completely, however, that all basic value problems have their roots in metaphysics, that I am inclined to look for the source of his weakness in theoretical ethics in his metaphysics. I have suggested above that this metaphysical source may be the inadequacy of his treatment of the problem of "substance" 19. I do not think, however, that this failure on Whitehead's part alone justifies a return to the notion of substantiality which he criticizes. There may, however, within the basic limits of his philosophy, be room for the development of a notion of individual substance as a creative emergent worthy of our profoundest ethical loyalties.
The central significance of Whitehead's provision of a new metaphysical basis for value inquiries is the tremendous suggestiveness of his notion of general ontological creative activity. It is really the exploration of the metaphysical analysis of that notion and of its consequences for questions of value that are the central subject of this paper. To me, at least, the metaphysical notion of creative activity makes some sort of sense, though some of the details of the notion seem obscure. And the idea that my moments of value experience may owe their immediate satisfactoriness ultimately to the joy of being a successful creator of a real world, and their "importance" to the contributions which they make to the universal task of creation brings to me at least an "edifying" *emotive" experience. I can only hope that I have shown that these notions have also a more "rational" justification.
Footnotes
1
See above, oh, 1, Sec. A of this paper.
2 See above,, oh. 7, Sec. B of this paper
3 See above, Ch. 6, Sec. C of this paper.
4 See above, oh. 7, Sec. A of this paper.
5 See above, Ch. 6, Sec. C of this paper.
6 Whitehead thinks that we inculcate too many abstract standards, and that is why people, even educated people, seem to be unable to make sound value judgments. "My own criticism of our traditional educational methods is that they are far too occupied with intellectual analysis, and. with the acquirement of formularized information. What I mean is, that we fail to strengthen habits of concrete appreciation of the individual facts in their full interplay of emergent values, and that we merely emphasize abstract formulations which ignore the aspect of the interplay of diverse values (SMW., p. 284)."
7 "The notion of human limitation requires guarding. There is an implicit philosophical tradition that there are set limitations for human experience, to be discovered in a blue-print preserved in some Institute of Technology. In the long history of humans from oysters to apes, and from apes to modern man, we can discern no trace of' such set imitation. Nor can I discern any reason, apart from dogmatic assumption, why any factor in the universe should not be manifest in impossible. We are then deprived of our chief instrument of recall, comparison, and communication. Nevertheless, we have no ground to limit our capacity for experience, by our existing technology of expression (ESP., p. 95)."
8 Schilpp, P.A., Whitehead's Moral Philosophy", in Schilpp, op. cit., pp. 606-7 and pp. 6l4-5; Millard, op. cit., p. 433; and Ely, op. cit., p. 52, all bring this charge against him in one form or another.
9 See above, oh. 7, Sec. B(2) and (3), of this paper. Mr. B. Morris says, rightly, I believe, that Whitehead's views on esthetics are "too wide" to be of much use in the arts themselves. ("The Art-Process and the Aesthetic Fact in Whitehead's Philosophy", in Schilpp, op. cit., p. 482).
10 See above, ch. 7, Sec. C, and below, sub-section (3) of this section.
11 See above, ch. 2, Sec.. D(4)(c), and below, sub-section (3) of this section.
12 Indeed, I think that Whitehead is rather good on these aspects of religion, but it is not the purpose of this particular paper to answer Mr. Ely's charges.
13 In his "autobiographical note" he quite seriously attributes this dominant theme in his philosophy to the influence on him of his wife (in Schilpp, op. cit., p. 482).
14 For instance, "All order is therefore aesthetic order, and the moral order is merely certain aspects at the aesthetic order. The actual world is the outcome of the aesthetic order, and the aesthetic order is derived from the immanence of God (RM., p. 104).
15 ESP., p. 98.
16 It is significant at least that a philosopher of Whitehead's stature and background in mathematics and the physical sciences should deliberately decide that esthetic experience leads to greater metaphysical profundities than these other departments of experience.
17 AI., p. 339.
18 It is significant, perhaps, that Sartre, some of whose doctrlnes have a slight similarity to some of Whitehead's views (see above, ch. 3, Soc. C, pp. 90-91 of this paper), also faces the charge of estheticism. He chooses to deny it, saying that what art and ethics have in common is that they are both instances of "creation and invention" (Existentialism, p. 51).
19 See above, ch. 7, Sec. C(2)(b) of this paper.
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